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The 1960s NAACP Campaign to Integrate Public Housing in Portland 
 
Like many other cities in the U.S. during the 1960s, Portland, Oregon featured an 
undeniable black ghetto, located in the heart of its Albina district. The Portland branch of the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) struggled throughout 
the 1960s to keep local government from perpetuating the existing ghetto. For years, the NAACP 
and other civil rights organizations protested plans from the Housing Authority of Portland 
(HAP) to build federally subsidized public housing units in the heart of Albina. In order to 
understand how and why the NAACP and other organizations disputed the plans of the HAP 
during the first half of the 1960s, I begin by looking at the powerful, unified voice formed by the 
NAACP and assess what tools the organization used to bend public opinion in its favor. From 
there, I analyze the NAACP efforts to bring federal attention to local public housing issues and 
follow that with a brief look at how Portland‟s situation fit into the national context of public 
housing. I assess the factors that led to Portland‟s 1960s housing problems, and conclude with a 
section on the HAP‟s efforts to divide the NAACP civil rights coalition. I argue that the NAACP 
and other civil rights organizations in Portland allied themselves effectively in the 1960s and 
played a major role in keeping the HAP from reinforcing the city‟s black ghetto through the use 
of public housing.   
 A number of historians have explored the topic of public housing and race in other U.S. 
cities, but only one has focused specifically on Portland during this period. I contrast both the 
situation in Chicago and Philadelphia, two cities commonly studied by historians, with what 
transpired in Portland. Arnold Hirsch crafted the blueprint by examining post-World War II 
public housing in Chicago. He coined the phrase “making the second ghetto” in order to describe 
the way Chicago‟s ghetto was reinforced through government involvement in public housing 
initiatives. In his interpretation, civil rights leaders in Chicago found themselves divided and 
overlooked by city planners who sought to build up the black ghetto. Stuart McElderry took a 
similar approach in his study of public housing in Portland during the 1960s, as he argued that 
civil rights groups in Portland were split and wielded little power on the issue of public housing. 
While I see most of the elements of Hirsch‟s concept of the “second ghetto” in Portland, I 
disagree with McElderry‟s take on the unity and impact of local civil rights organizations.
1
 
Throughout its Portland campaign, the NAACP always managed to rally a united front of 
people who felt convinced that HAP policies promoted segregation. A watershed moment for the 
group came on June 24, 1963, at a public hearing that featured a groundswell of support for the 
NAACP cause. Initially unwilling to listen to public opinion, the HAP had been backed into 
capitulating by the Greater Portland Council of Churches (GPCC), a close counterpart of the 
NAACP. The GPCC had urged the authority to hold a public hearing to discuss a proposed 135-
unit public housing project slated for Portland‟s Albina district. Torn between the desperate need 
for public housing and the proposed location of the HAP development – right in the midst of a 
black ghetto – virtually all of the major civil rights organizations in Portland, led by the NAACP 
and the Urban League, showed up at the meeting to voice their disapproval. Representatives 
from local Jewish, Baptist, Quaker, Methodist, Presbyterian, and Catholic religious groups also 
joined in unison against the HAP. Close to 300 people, most of them opposed to the project, 
showed up at  
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the hearing.
2
 The NAACP also presented the HAP with over four hours of recorded testimony 
from Albina residents set against the project.
3
 
A host of speakers arrived in person to outline their stance against the proposal. Perhaps 
the most salient message came from John C. Pock, a sociology professor at Reed College, in 
Portland. Pock warned the HAP that the “effect of your decision will be to consolidate a Negro 
ghetto in Portland and to legitimize it for the next 40 years – or roughly one generation.” 
According to Pock, new public housing projects must be used to integrate Portland‟s black 
community. He felt the struggle to desegregate Portland‟s Black Belt – the 52 percent of blacks 
living within a one-square mile sector with a population density six times the rest of Portland – 
should not be ignored by the HAP. Pock and the rest of the civil rights coalition made a bold 
statement by opposing the 135-unit project. The existing 664 public housing units in Portland 




 The NAACP and the Urban League of Portland had already grown weary of the 
numerous attempts by the local housing authority to build new public housing units in the slums 
of Albina. Even before the June 24 public hearing mentioned above, the HAP had tried to push 
forward a proposal that would locate new public housing in the existing ghetto. On October 12, 
1961, the HAP announced plans for a 58-unit Albina public housing project. The proposal 
quickly drew the attention of the NAACP, the Urban League, the Albina Ministerial Association, 
the Catholic Council on Human Relations, the Albina Neighborhood Community Council, the 
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Immaculate Heart Church, and the Stella Maris House (a Catholic organization). These groups 
issued a joint letter to Louis Ambler, a regional director with the federal Public Housing 
Administration, criticizing the HAP‟s handling of the project. Speaking out against the “high-
handed manner” of the HAP, the groups claimed the local housing authority had denied their 
requests to meet and discuss the issues on five different occasions. Instead, they claimed the 
HAP went ahead obstinately without consulting the public. The letter outlined the group‟s main 
concern as the perpetuation of segregation within the existing ghetto, as well as the potential 
increase in the number of families packed into an already over-crowded area. The groups 
recommended that the project be canceled and that new public housing units be scattered outside 
of the black ghetto.
5
  
 Although the civil rights coalition remained unified in its claims against the HAP‟s 
segregationist policies, HAP executives countered with their belief that the project would clean 
up the area. Roy Renoud, chairman of the HAP‟s board of commissioners, emphasized the 
project would help to “upgrade the deteriorated Albina district,” a line of reasoning that soon 
became the modus operandi whenever the HAP tried to justify the placement of new public 
housing in existing slums. Renoud also said blacks would continue to live in the neighborhood, 
because it was their preferred choice.
6
 In late February, 1962, the NAACP coalition once again 
issued a joint statement on the public housing project slated for Albina. Their argument, which 
had evolved since their last public statement, now included a section detailing the proximity of 
the proposed site to commercial property and busy streets. They saw this as a definite hazard, 
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given the many children living in public housing. Once again, the group also mentioned the 
HAP‟s failure to hold public meetings in the area before the site was selected.
7
  
 Portland‟s leading African-American newspaper, the Northwest Defender, proved the 
toughest obstacle to overcome, as the NAACP coalition set out to convince the black community 
that HAP policies promoted segregation. Even while the NAACP coalition gained support from 
within the white community, the Defender declined to join the growing movement. Although the 
NAACP coalition won over the Multnomah County Democrats by February, 1962, the staff at 
the Defender remained in favor of the 58-unit Albina site until March, 1962. For the Democrats, 
the issue of supporting the civil rights coalition proved to be somewhat divisive. After lengthy 
debate, they voted in favor of opposing the project, saying it promoted segregation. Some 
Democrats, like Chuck Foster, who was also a member of the HAP, denounced their counterparts 
for supporting a resolution “that would condemn a Housing Commission that has one of the best 
records of any in the country.” Foster questioned why blacks, specifically Urban League 
president E. Shelton Hill, opposed the project, saying “(Hill) seems to prefer we don‟t do 
anything in Albina for his people.”
8
  
From the perspective of the Defender, the issue proved a little more complex, as the 
newspaper‟s staff respectfully disagreed with the civil rights groups, based on the critical need 
for more public housing within the black community. While the Defender supported the HAP in 
this particular situation, the newspaper also printed statements from the NAACP coalition as well 
as the HAP, providing more balanced coverage than the Oregonian. When given an opportunity 
to express his views to the black community, Renoud labeled his opposition as being “motivated 
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by theoretical approaches to the problem of low-rent housing objectives.”
9
 Gradually, however, 
the Defender switched its views to align with those of the NAACP coalition. By mid-March, 
1962, the Defender carried a considerably different viewpoint in its editorial section, under the 
headline, “No New Ghetto for Albina.” This new stance proved more compatible with the 
statements of most black leaders within Portland. In the Defender‟s editorial, the lead is the 
statement “we should not let ourselves be bamboozled into accepting the Albina housing 
project,” followed by the question, “will Mr. Renoud and company stop at nothing to force this 
pill down the throats of the people of Portland?” Judging by the tone of the editorial, it becomes 
clear that the Defender staff counted themselves among those who had been bamboozled by the 
“candy coating” of the HAP.
10
 
 With the Northwest Defender now supporting the civil rights coalition, the groups 
continued to try and sway public opinion in their favor and against the proposed 58-unit public 
housing project slated for Albina. The Urban League highlighted the link between segregated 
housing and segregated schools, by pointing out the 48-unit Maple Mallory public housing 
project located only seven blocks north of the proposed site. While non-whites occupied only 
15.5 percent of all public housing units in Portland, the Urban League listed Maple Mallory‟s 
occupancy as 95.8 percent non-white, containing 41 units with black families and only two 
Caucasian households. Five schools within the Albina district already featured black enrollment 
of more than 50 percent.
11
 Meanwhile, the 1960 census measured the black population of 
                                                     
9 Roy F. Renoud, “Policy Statement,” Northwest Defender, March 1, 1962, sec. 1, 2; “Awaken Albina Awaken,” 
Northwest Defender, March 1, 1962, sec. 1, 1; Urban League of Portland, et al., “Statement of Fact Regarding the 
Public Housing Project Planned for Albina,” Northwest Defender, March 1, 1962, sec. 1, 1. 
10 “No New Ghetto for Albina,” Northwest Defender, March 14, 1962, sec. 1, 1. 
11 “Urban League Claims Housing Project Promotes Segregation,” Oregonian, May 11, 1962, sec. 1, 30.  
Portland at 1.03 percent of the total population. Blacks made up only 18,000 of Portland‟s total 
population of 1.8 million, but more than 11,000 lived in the Albina district.
12
  
By no means did the Urban League and other civil rights groups attempt to critique the 
Albina public housing project solely as a potential danger for the black community. This type of 
argument would have greatly limited the influence of the civil rights coalition. As the Urban  
League stated in a pamphlet, segregation was a “bane to the total community,” and one that 
“increases public costs for health, welfare, police protection, etc.”
13
 
 Eventually, with a steady stream of backlash coming from the NAACP coalition, the 
Portland City Council stepped in at the end of 1962, and after a study of the central Albina area, 
deemed it unsuitable for new public housing. With no long-term market for residential property 
in the area, the study carried out by the Portland Planning Commission recommended the HAP 
look for a different location for new public housing units.
14
 
 Both the NAACP coalition and the HAP regrouped toward the summer of 1963, with the 
HAP pitching a new 135-unit public housing, mentioned earlier, and the NAACP once again 
seeking to stir up public opinion against the HAP. Both the 58-unit public housing site and the 
subsequent 135-unit public housing site tested the resolve of Portland‟s civil rights coalition, but 
in the end both proposals were rejected.
15
 By the summer of 1963, however, civil rights leaders 
in Portland recognized that Renoud and the HAP remained as intractable as ever. In an interview 
with a local television station, Renoud defended the authority by saying, “it is not our 
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responsibility to resolve the racial question at all.” Rather, in Renoud‟s mind, the HAP‟s main 
responsibility was simply to provide low-rent housing for the city‟s poor.
16
 
As far as scattered housing sites were concerned, Renoud said the authority looked into 
the idea but found it to be too costly. In the TV interview, Renoud stated, “it‟s real nice to get up 
on a soap box and say you can do it this way but the only thing we can do is to provide housing  
within the financial means that we have and there isn‟t another darn thing we can do.”
17
 Running 
contrary to Renoud‟s comments, the Catholic Sentinel featured an article about the public 
hearing held earlier, indicating testimony revealed the HAP could in fact spend more money on 
land for public housing, in order to build a scattered sites public housing project.
18
 Renoud 
lacked the willingness, but held the power to place new public housing outside of the black 
ghetto in Albina.  
 The HAP, like Renoud, found no shortage of excuses to throw at the civil rights coalition 
in order to justify HAP‟s desires to place new public housing sites in Albina. As Arnold Hirsch 
found in researching the history of public housing in Chicago, “the real tragedy surrounding the 
emergence of the modern ghetto is not that it has been inherited but that it has been periodically 
renewed and strengthened.”
19
 Undoubtedly, this appeared to be what the HAP had in mind for 
Portland‟s black community. Sagaciously, the NAACP coalition realized they would need more 
than just local public opinion to change the course of HAP.  
 A key reason why the NAACP campaign proved so effective was that it went beyond 
local pressure and sought to bring about change by involving the federal government. The first 
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target on their list, U.S. President John F. Kennedy, had endeared himself to black urban voters 
in his 1960 presidential campaign. By promising to fight for a federal law against housing 
discrimination, Kennedy raised the expectations of black leaders.
20
 When Kennedy issued 
Executive Order 11063, banning racial discrimination in federally funded housing as of 
November 10, 1962, most saw it as a minor victory for civil rights. Historian Arnold Hirsch 
echoed the sentiments of many in describing the order as “a modest first correction” in the 
struggle for equal housing opportunities.
21
 Kennedy was, after all, still the same man who had 
come to Portland shortly before he was elected in 1960 and praised the HAP for integrating its 
public housing projects. The HAP‟s 1962 annual report featured a smiling Kennedy posing for a 
photo, while holding a white baby.  Right next to him stood Gene W. Rossman, executive 
director of the HAP.
22
 Rossman‟s photo-op with Kennedy took place in a public housing 
apartment in the 54-unit Iris Court Complex, which at the time of Kennedy‟s visit housed only 
three black families. Token integration was the norm in Portland‟s public housing projects. The 
largest, Columbia Villa, featured 440 units, of which 46 housed black families and 387 housed 
white families. Dekum Court, the second largest with 86 units, housed four black families and 81 
white families. Maple Mallory Court, containing 48 units, housed 37 black families and seven 
white families. 
23
 This was not what the NAACP coalition had strived for, but it had to have been 
an improvement on the situation in many southern cities, at least from Kennedy‟s perspective.  
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 The Portland NAACP, under the leadership of its president Mayfield Webb, sought to 
make more of an impact the next time the HAP tried to obtain another endorsement from 
Kennedy. When Edith Green, a Democratic congresswoman from Oregon, announced that 
President Kennedy planned to visit Portland in late September of 1963, Webb and the NAACP 
made a stand. Kennedy‟s West Coast visit, scheduled to include several stops in Oregon, would 
see him dedicate a new high-rise public housing project for seniors in Portland on September 28, 
1963.
24
 Hyped as the first high-rise, low-rent public housing project on the Pacific Coast 
exclusively for seniors, Kennedy‟s dedication of the 180-unit project was intended to serve as 
another public relations coup for the HAP.
25
 Webb had a different agenda. He pointed out the 
HAP‟s alleged failure to inform blacks that they were accepting applications for the new project, 
and mentioned the possibility that the NAACP might picket the HAP during Kennedy‟s visit. 
Not one of the units in Northwest Towers was to be filled by a black occupant. Webb felt that by 
the time blacks found out the HAP was taking applications for Northwest Towers, the HAP 
already had more than enough applications to fill the project. In dedicating the project, Webb 
believed Kennedy would be “patting the Housing Authority on the back” and in a sense “that 
would make them untouchables.”
26
  
Webb and the NAACP on several occasions had pressed hard to influence local and 
federal officials to step in and overrule the HAP plans for Albina. A few months earlier, at the 
end of July, 1963, Webb sent an acerbic letter to Edith Green urging her to step in and stop the 
Albina project. Webb castigated Green for her neutral stance by saying, “I am reminded of your 
[report from Congress] of March-June 1963 in which you stated, „Dante once said that the hottest 
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places in hell are reserved for those who remain neutral in time of crisis‟.”
27
 On a local level, 
NAACP political action chair Lorna Marple, a longtime NAACP member and former branch 
president, sent a scathing letter to Portland mayor Terry Schrunk, suggesting he would be wise to 
start working more cooperatively with the civil rights community. She promised Schrunk that “to 
join with the morally righteous in this movement, cannot be expected to hurt anyone politically 
at this juncture.”
28
 The NAACP leadership had already pleaded for help, but found little 
response. Now, with Kennedy scheduled to visit, they adopted a more aggressive approach.  
 Although it was an unpopular move within the white political arena, Webb‟s threatened 
picketing of the HAP allowed the NAACP to air its grievances on a national level. Also, by 
vacillating over whether or not to picket the HAP during the President‟s visit, Webb and the 
NAACP sent local politicians scrambling to prevent a public relations disaster. Edith Green, who 
had organized the visit, turned irate over the actions of Webb and the NAACP. Regarding the 
HAP handling of Northwest Towers, Green claimed, “there is not a scrap of evidence of 
discrimination.” Green, on this occasion, was powerless. Under pressure, as a result of the 
NAACP threats to picket, HAP chairman Roy Renoud sent a telegram to Green, asking for the 
visit to be cancelled. The Oregonian called the move “a victory” for Webb and a “back-of-the-
hand” to Green.
29
 Amazed at how easily the HAP bended under the pressure of the NAACP, 
Portland Mayor Terry Schrunk described the HAP move as somewhat of an overreaction, saying, 
“if the President of the United States can be intimidated by a comparatively small group of 
people who have become emotionally involved in an issue, then we are in real trouble.”
30
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 Through the end of September, 1963 and into October, Webb and the NAACP used the 
Kennedy incident to keep the focus on the HAP and its policies. Federal investigators from the 
Housing and Home Finance Agency looked into the discrimination charges and found nothing 
wrong with HAP policies. According to HHFA commissioner Marie McGuire, the statistics 
proved little. Even though the statistics showed 97 to 99 percent white occupancy in three of the 
Portland‟s public housing projects, 92 percent white occupancy in two of the projects and 93 
percent black occupancy in one project, McGuire felt they did not tell the entire story. McGuire 
explained that “percentages which may appear to be unsatisfactory can result even when there is 
full compliance with equal opportunity,” and insisted that the HAP‟s case fell into this type of 
category. What McGuire and the HHFA wanted was specific evidence of discrimination.
31
 Webb 
came forward with Jimmie Proctor, a 58-year old black senior who filed suit against the HAP for 




 By bringing the federal and state government into the controversy with the HAP, the 
NAACP may not have won any judicial rulings, as in the case of Proctor, or even been able to 
prove their case of discrimination to the HHFA, but that couldn‟t have been Webb‟s main goal. 
Rather, he wanted to keep the HAP from gaining leverage on the NAACP coalition by receiving 
a public endorsement from the President. Keeping Kennedy away forced the HAP to realize that 
the NAACP wielded considerable political power in its own right, and that the HAP could not 
monopolize the media spotlight or force its views on an unwilling black coalition. A graduate of 
the Northwestern College of Law in Portland, Webb started his practice in 1960 and became 
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president of the NAACP Portland branch in 1962. He must have known it would be virtually 
impossible to score a legal victory in court against the HAP. In his 1959 report for the 
Commission on Race and Housing, Davis McEntire, a social welfare professor at UC-Berkeley, 
had already found that most civil rights groups and minorities earned minimal results when 
bringing forward accusations of subtle racism. Based on his research, McEntire found that 
“against this type of concealed, legal discrimination, minority individuals are virtually helpless,” 
largely because “they may prosecute and win an occasional law suit, but in most cases 
discriminatory intent cannot be proved in court.”
33
  
Legal issues aside, support for Webb and the NAACP continued both during and after the 
Kennedy incident. The Urban League, the Greater Portland Council of Churches and the 
Citizen‟s League for Equal Opportunity backed the NAACP. Even though none of these groups 
had threatened to picket the HAP, they were comfortable with the NAACP stance. The council 
of churches issued a statement referring to the NAACP as “an alert, intelligent, responsible 
citizen group,” and emphasized the need to look at the situation in context and “ask why it 
happened and what it symbolizes.”
34
 While many local politicians were miffed at not getting to 
see Kennedy, some local Democrats like Marsha Adelsheim, central committee vice chairman, 
drew some positives from the incident, saying “this cancellation may serve to dramatize the fact 
that the Northwest also has problems of segregation that need work.”
35
 In general, the NAACP 
actions caused many to question Portland‟s longstanding reputation as a liberal city. Was 
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Portland really a liberal paradise for transplanted southerners or a transplanted southern city, as 
some blacks in Portland would say?  
 By pointing out the disastrous effects of public housing and urban renewal in Chicago, 
the NAACP coalition in Portland strengthened their argument against HAP policies. With such a 
small black population in the 1960s, Portland never came close to replicating some of the 
country‟s major black ghettos. Portland‟s public housing policies, even if deeply rooted in 
segregationist ideals, could not have built up the same type of extensive black ghettos as the kind 
produced in cities like Chicago and Philadelphia. Yet, there existed a noticeable effort on the part 
of the NAACP coalition to create the idea that Portland, if all went horribly awry in public 
housing, could fall into the mold of Chicago or Philadelphia. During the public hearing on June 
24, 1963, where most in attendance showed their hostility toward the proposed 135-unit public 
housing project slated for Albina, Rabbi Emmanuel Rose propagated the idea that Portland could 
be heading toward its own catastrophe. Representing Temple Beth Israel in Portland, the Rabbi 
exhorted the HAP to seize the opportunity “to catch a problem before it becomes a severe one, 
before it erupts into the serious proportions of Chicago and elsewhere.”
36
 Whether hyperbole or 
not, the Rabbi‟s comments alluded to the fact that Portland‟s public housing situation shared 
several similarities with what was occurring in Chicago, a major metropolis in which 30 percent 
of the population was black.
37
  
Perhaps the most infamous U.S. public housing project in the 1960s, the Robert Taylor 
Homes, were built in Chicago in the early 1960s and opened in 1962. Right in the midst of the 
NAACP campaign in Portland against the HAP, the Robert Taylor Homes served to illustrate the 
failures of public housing.  Featuring 4,500 high-rise apartments, housing 27,000 residents on a 
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95-acre site, the project soon became a sprawling black ghetto, and the largest public housing 
project in the world. 
38
 Chicago‟s city council first set aside land for the project beginning in the 
1950s, but gradually the white community, led by the city council, rejected any proposal that 
would have situated the project on vacant land outside of the black ghetto. As a result, the Taylor 
homes were placed next to the Stateway Gardens project, which already had 1,684 units of 
public housing and stood as the framework of Chicago‟s black ghetto.
39
 
 On the surface, the sheer volume of the public housing statistics in Chicago seem to 
dwarf those of Portland; however, the NAACP coalition astutely drew comparisons between the 
two situations. Although public housing in Portland only accounted for 664 units, the HAP 
proposals to place public housing within Albina‟s black ghetto proved strikingly similar to what 
was occurring in Chicago. Between 1955 and 1966, Chicago‟s city council approved 51 public 
housing sites, 49 of which were placed in black ghettos located in the south, west and near north 
side of the city.
40
 In Philadelphia, the same type of pattern took form, as all public housing 
projects planned and built between 1956 and 1967 were situated in black ghettos or transitional 
(quickly dilapidating, increasingly black) neighborhoods.
41
  
One explanation for these numbers came from historian Arnold Hirsch, who coined the 
phrase “making the second ghetto” in order to describe the way in politicians used public 
housing as a tool to reinforce the ghetto in Chicago. According to Hirsch‟s analysis, the first 
ghetto took shape during the World War I period and relied on a hostile private real estate 
environment and general enmity from whites toward blacks. Intimidation in the private real 
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estate environment was all that was needed to keep Chicago segregated, while government 
involvement proved unnecessary. With blacks migrating en masse to work in the cities during 
World War II, urban centers like Chicago soon found themselves unprepared for the major influx 
of blacks. In this case, government involvement was needed to reinforce the black ghetto as it 
expanded and transformed following the war. Public housing proved to be paramount in 
containing and reshaping the ghetto, according to Hirsch.
42
 
 Portland‟s public housing story in the 1960s resembled what Hirsch described, but on a 
smaller scale, and with a key difference being the influential role of the Portland branch of the 
NAACP. While the Chicago NAACP publicly attacked the Chicago Housing Authority‟s 
discriminatory policies in 1953, by the late 1950s and into the early 1960s the Chicago branch 
had lost its political clout. According to Hirsch, the city‟s NAACP branch “had no regular staff, 
was torn by factions, and could attract but twenty or thirty people to its meetings.”
43
 This was a 
stark contrast from Portland‟s NAACP during the same period.  
The civil rights movement in Chicago lacked the cohesiveness needed to stop white 
politicians from using public housing to reinforce the black ghetto. Like Portland, Chicago‟s 
black community welcomed new public housing but lacked the unity needed to keep it from 
being placed within black ghettos. One black newspaper editor described the conundrum by 
saying, “we think that public housing is wrong the way it‟s being handled…but if we come out 
against it hard, then they‟ll just not build it anywhere, and that would be worse. So what do we 
do? We just mumble about it.”
44
 Portland‟s civil rights coalition did more than simply mumble. 
Still, even with a strong movement building against the HAP, there was a danger that the HAP 
would simply ignore the voices of discontent.  Yet, as Reed College sociologist John C. Pock 
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phrased it, “Portland has a more than reasonable opportunity to avoid making the kinds of 
mistakes that are almost destroying such large urban centers as New York, Chicago, Los Angeles 
and others.” Pock delivered this message at the June 24, 1963 public hearing on the 135-unit 
project sited for Albina.
45
 At the time, Pock undoubtedly realized that Portland already had a 
questionable track record, making its own share of mistakes dating back to the 1940s.  
 Public housing policy stemming from the World War II era not only caused the black 
ghetto in Albina to form, it also triggered the discontent within the black community that drove 
the NAACP movement forward during their 1960s campaign against public housing. The civil 
rights grievances against the HAP dated back to the WWII era, when the housing authority failed 
to come up with adequate housing for the 20-25,000 black workers who had come to work in 
Portland‟s shipbuilding industry. On Dec. 12, 1941, the HAP was founded as an emergency 
wartime measure and then in 1942 made an initial attempt to address the general housing 
shortage.
46
 To start, the HAP proposed building a 4,900-unit public housing complex to house 
wartime workers. At the time, statistics showed a need for 37,000 total public housing units.
47
 
From there, the HAP contemplated a plan to build a dorm for black shipyard workers in the 
Albina area. When 500 Albina residents (the area was still largely white and working class at the 
time) protested the idea, the HAP backed away from the plan.
48
 Even when Vanport –  the 
largest wartime public housing facility in the country –  was built in the fall of 1942, black 
workers still faced a major housing shortage. Many of the city‟s blacks moved to the Albina 
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district or into temporary public housing.
49
 On May 30, 1948, the Vanport flood wiped out 6,000 




 The Vanport flood had great significance on the 1960s public housing campaign against 
the HAP, in that it paved the way for Portland‟s black community to become concentrated in the 
Albina district. The two main census tracts within the Albina district, tracts 22 and 23, underwent 
major transformations. Together, the two tracts gained 3,484 nonwhites and lost 2,713 whites 
between 1940 and 1950. This concentration of the black community came as a direct result of the 
private housing discrimination that became predominant following World War II and the 
Vanport disaster.
51
 Shortly after the war, in 1949, the Portland Realty Board expelled a realtor 
for selling property to a black man within a white district.
52
 Discrimination in private housing 
served as a precursor for the discrimination that wound its way into the public housing picture 
during the 1960s. Even in the 1960s, Portland NAACP president Mayfield Webb enlisted the 
help of about 20 local attorneys who volunteered to accompany black families during their 
search for un-segregated private housing.
53
 Bolstered by the segregated private housing market, 
Portland‟s public housing system only needed to play a minor role in keeping blacks from being 
integrated. Where Chicago and Philadelphia used public housing as a major tool in promoting 
and enforcing segregation, Portland relied largely on the private housing industry to maintain 
segregation. Following the Vanport flood of 1948, the HAP lobbied Oregon‟s congressional 
delegation to land $50 million in federal loans and grants. These grants were used to help 
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Portland‟s private construction companies build new homes for flood victims.
54
 The private real 
estate industry, as HAP officials knew, was clearly the more effective tool for enforcing the 
segregation that had become standard in Portland. In turn, the private real estate and home 
building industries used their political muscle to ensure that public housing projects were voted 
down both in 1950 and in 1952. Stuart McElderry described the irony of their argument by 
saying that private interest groups claimed that “[public housing] retarded rather than advanced 
integration and only encouraged the development of ghettos and slums.”
55
 Clearly, HAP history 
showed that the organization had never been committed to helping out the black community, or 
building any form of public housing, for that matter. Many within the civil rights coalition saw 
no reason to believe the HAP had suddenly taken a newfound interest in the black community 
beginning in the 1960s. Even with the critical need for public housing in Portland following the 
Vanport disaster, the HAP stalled on building public housing. The HAP‟s first new public 
housing project after World War II turned out to be Northwest Towers, the contentious senior 
housing complex that polarized the NAACP and the HAP.
56
  
 Sophistry on the part of the HAP, intended to divide and weaken the NAACP coalition, 
triggered a great deal of animosity toward the HAP and in some cases served to embolden the 
opposition. After the Northwest Towers incident, the NAACP picketed Portland‟s city hall on 
September 30, 1963, asking for the removal of Roy Renoud, chairman of the HAP‟s board of 
commissioners, and Gene Rossman, the HAP‟s executive director. As evidence, the NAACP 
released a statement outlining their position. In it, the NAACP referenced “the history of the 
housing authority and their beliefs that certain ethnic groups desire their own projects and 
settlements.” The NAACP was irked by the idea that the HAP was promoting the belief that 
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blacks in Portland during the 1960s had the freedom to move freely within the public housing 
market and simply chose to live in black projects. Also, the NAACP clarified its frustration with 
the HAP‟s insistence on building new public housing within the Albina ghetto. As well, the 
NAACP reiterated its accusations of discrimination against the HAP in the handling of the 
Northwest Towers application process. Part of their claim was that the HAP “moved up a Negro 
from low on the list to immediate occupancy” in order to cover up racial discrimination. With the 
Northwest Towers incident fresh in their minds, the NAACP statement also included a section 
saying “the housing authority misled the public in suggesting that NAACP would picket the 




 Another organization, the Citizen‟s League for Equal Opportunity (CLEO), joined the 
NAACP in attacking the HAP. CLEO also asked for Renoud to be removed from his position. 
Like the NAACP, they released a statement condemning the Housing Authority, questioning 
Renoud‟s ideals and his publicly stated position of being “color-blind.” CLEO highlighted the 
fact that the HAP had no black employees and had given serious thought to the construction of 
“a project restricted to persons of Chinese ancestry.” In relation to the two Albina public housing 
projects, CLEO shot down Renoud‟s arguments that financial constraints forced the HAP to site 
the two public housing projects in the Albina district. According to the statement, both the 
deputy commissioner of the federal Public Housing Administration, and a CLEO attorney looked 
into Renoud‟s claims and found them to be false. In addition, CLEO also alleged that Renoud 
refused to consider the idea of maintaining a master list of applicants for public housing. This 
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type of master list, based on a first-come, first-served basis, would allow the HAP to require 
families to accept the first available vacancy. Regardless of whether it was in a traditionally 
black or white public housing complex, families would be forced to take the first option or risk 
being relegated to the bottom of the list. Renoud had shot down this idea based on federal laws. 
Once again, CLEO attorneys found no such law and officials within the federal housing agency 
pointed out that other housing authorities used master lists. Furthermore, as the CLEO statement 
pointed out, no other HAP projects were named for individuals yet both of the Albina proposals 
were to be named after the late Daisy Williams, “a much-loved Negro lady” and the wife of 
longtime NAACP member Edgar Williams. CLEO, like all of the other civil rights groups, took 
great offence at the proposed name, saying the “transparent attempt to make the otherwise 
objectionable proposal palatable to elements of the Negro community was an insult.”
58
  
The HAP‟s decision to name the proposed projects after Daisy Williams was seen as a 
calculated maneuver by the NAACP. In their opinion, the move was aimed at dividing the city‟s 
black leaders and in one sense it worked. Edgar Williams, a member of the NAACP since 1919, 
was a historic figure. He had campaigned hard for a public accommodations law ever since 
arriving in Portland in 1918 and when the law came into place in 1953, a tearful Williams was 
understandably elated.
59
 A longtime, influential member of Portland‟s black community and a 
key cog in the NAACP for many years, Edgar Williams had also been a member of the HAP 
since 1960. When Williams was appointed as a HAP commissioner in 1960, the NAACP 
leadership seemed thrilled with the idea of having a prominent black leader in such a key 
position.
60
 Gradually, the relationship between Williams and the NAACP dissolved. Throughout 
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the NAACP campaign against the HAP during the 1960s, Williams decried the NAACP and 
other civil rights organizations for not supporting the two Albina public housing proposals. 
When Williams questioned the right of a local minister to speak on behalf of the NAACP at a 
public hearing regarding the 135-unit Albina housing project, the NAACP asked for his 
resignation. Williams obliged, but vented his frustrations in an interview with the Oregonian, 
saying he felt a great deal of “petty jealousy” relating to the Albina housing project because it 
was to be named after his wife. Meanwhile, NAACP president Webb defended his actions, 




 From the outset, the HAP had relied on a strategy intended to divide the NAACP 
coalition and create tension within the black community, however the NAACP stayed united. 
The NAACP fought back to keep the HAP from using the Edgar Williams incident to imply that 
the civil rights coalition was effectively divided. Williams resigned close to two months before 
the Northwest Towers incident took place and a dysfunctional, disjointed NAACP could not 
have organized such an effective protest against the HAP. Perhaps Williams‟ resignation served 
as a changing of the guard. Although Williams saw any form of new public housing as a 
positive, NAACP leaders like Webb carried much greater expectations. As Webb stated in a 
speech before the Portland City Club a few days after Williams stepped down, the NAACP was 
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 In general, the HAP‟s deceptiveness agitated the NAACP coalition but never did it cause 
the movement to fall apart or subside. Perhaps the greatest example of this deceptiveness came 
from the HAP‟s Roy Renoud, in the form of his written proposal to the Greater Portland Council 
of Churches. The proposal, sent by Renoud after the public hearing on June 24, 1963, finally 
acknowledged the overwhelming opposition from the black community toward the proposed 
135-unit Albina project. Renoud‟s way of compromising involved sending the proposal to the 
council of churches asking the organization to join the HAP in forming a race relations 
committee on public housing. Gene Rossman, the HAP‟s executive director referred to the 
proposal as the beginning of an effort in which “Portland could well establish a pattern which 
would receive National recognition in the field of racial relations.” In one sense, Renoud and the 
HAP were making a promising gesture. In another, the HAP‟s proposal was a token gesture.   
Within the proposal, Renoud referred to Portland‟s civil rights leaders as the “alleged 
spokesmen for local minority groups.” He thanked those who were “genuinely interested in 
assisting… in solving the problems of racial integration,” and expressed disdain for the “the 
injection of high-sounding theories and panaceas that have no practical application to our 
problems.” Toward the end of the proposal, Renoud stated his objection to dealing with 
“unrealistic demands from groups who seek to force their views through threats of court action, 
picketing, and violence.”
63
 In theory, Renoud‟s proposal looked promising, but the intent of the 
proposal, which was addressed only to the council of churches and neither the NAACP nor the 
Urban League, was intended to dilute the effect of the two main civil rights organizations in 
Portland. Within a few days, the council of churches responded with a letter praising the HAP for 
making taking such a “positive step forward.” Beyond that, the letter defended the NAACP 
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coalition by saying “these are not alleged but real leaders of the best interests of the local 
minority groups” who should be “praised, not criticized, for their dedicated efforts.” Even in 
spite of Renoud‟s best efforts, the civil rights community remained united. The council of 
churches also questioned why Renoud chose to reference the threat of violence in his letter, 




 Undoubtedly, the NAACP adopted a far more militant stance than any other civil rights 
organizations during their 1960s struggle against the HAP, yet any idea of the Portland NAACP 
becoming violent was simply a product of HAP propaganda. By implying that the NAACP had 
become a militant, potentially violent organization, the HAP sought to turn many of Portland‟s 
blacks against the civil rights organization. At various times this strategy worked, but only within 
a small segment of the black community. For example, shortly after the NAACP picketed city 
hall, demanding the removal of Renoud and Rossman, a group of blacks from Albina offered 
their apologies to mayor Terry Schrunk. The Oregonian story detailing the incident quoted 
Vivian Barnett, president of the Albina Taxpayers Association as saying, “Negroes don‟t picket” 
and accusing the NAACP of creating tension between blacks and whites.
65
 Barnett had already 
taken on the role of spokesperson for a small group of Albina residents who previously criticized 
the NAACP plans to picket the HAP at Northwest Towers. She told the Oregonian, “I don‟t see 
why somebody doesn‟t make Webb and the NAACP prove their charges.”
66
 As for her 
credibility as a spokesperson, Barnett was just one of a group of black realtors from the Albina 
area who stood to gain from the perpetuation of the district‟s ghetto. When the Albina Real 
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Estate Brokers Association (a group of black realtors) went on record against the NAACP plans 
to picket the HAP during Kennedy‟s visit, NAACP president Webb responded by saying “this 
group, like any other, has the right to an opinion, but after all, these are realtors you know, and 
they have a stake.”
67
 For some reason, however, the Oregonian consistently gave credence to 
HAP claims.  
 Stuart McElderry, the only historian to study Portland‟s public housing situation during 
the 1960s in any great detail, relied heavily on the Oregonian as a source. He argued that 
Portland‟s public housing conflicts “introduced a period of crisis for the city‟s civil rights 
coalition.” He believed the civil rights movement ended up torn by the struggle over public 
housing. McElderry conceded only “at best half-victories” for the civil rights movement in the 
matters of the Albina projects and the Northwest Towers incident. McElderry asserted that the 
“coalition‟s moderate members objected to the NAACP‟s militant tactics.”
68
 Although the point 
is certainly debatable, I question which sources he used in order to formulate his opinion. He 
used the Oregonian extensively to back up his thoughts on public housing, instead of balancing 
the newspaper‟s take with those of the civil rights coalition, or the Northwest Defender. At one 
point, he used a story from the Oregonian as a critical piece of evidence in suggesting the public 
housing controversies served to derail Portland‟s civil rights movement. The Oregonian‟s story, 
titled “Internal Controversy Threatened Oregon Civil Rights Movement in 1963,” failed to even 
quote NAACP president Mayfield Webb and glossed over the many effective actions undertaken 
by civil rights leaders.
69
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I find McElderry too often depended on the perspective of the Oregonian, which served 
as somewhat of a mouthpiece for the HAP during the public housing controversy.
70
 While 
McElderry felt the civil rights coalition “effectively altered the HAP‟s policies and made more 
Portlanders aware of residential segregation in public housing,” he felt “conditions for poor 
blacks in the Albina district remained unchanged.”
71
 This final point rang true, but addressed a 
problem far beyond the scope of the NAACP coalition. While effective in keeping the HAP from 
reinforcing Portland‟s black ghetto through the use of public housing, the NAACP coalition 
operated within a segregated system. The civil rights coalition in Portland, for all its strengths, 
did not draft neighborhood plans or determine where new public housing should be placed. 
Organizations like the NAACP simply opposed locating new public housing in black ghettos and 
suggested alternate locations. Clearly, the NAACP coalition recognized that the HAP, based on 
its history, was never all that determined to build public housing in Portland. The HAP, 
embroiled in controversy ever since its inception in 1941, was an organization based more on 
ideas than actions. The failure of the HAP to provide adequate, affordable housing for low-
income Portlanders fit well into the national picture, in which a well-meaning social welfare 
program missed the mark. While President Richard Nixon banned any further construction of 
federally subsidized public housing in 1974, public housing was already in its last throes by the 
mid 1960s.
72
 Many cities were eventually forced to tear down massive public housing 
complexes, such as the Robert Taylor Homes, but in Portland public housing made but a minor 
dent.   
In order to assess the efficacy of the NAACP and other civil rights organizations, it is 
important to clarify the situation in Portland during the 1960s. Neither Mayfield Webb nor any 
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other black leader possessed the power to transform the HAP or the racial ideology of 
Portlanders. Rather, their methods involved creating a loud, unified voice and stirring up public 
opinion against the HAP‟s segregationist policies. The NAACP coalition remained united 
throughout the 1960s and convinced many Portlanders that the HAP promoted segregation in 
public housing. In turn, the HAP was forced to listen, albeit begrudgingly, to the input of 
Portland‟s black community on the issue of public housing and work toward de-segregating its 
existing public housing structures.
73
 No debilitated, disconnected organization could have 
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